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Considerable emphasis has been placed in Northern Ireland as elsewhere 
upon providing an estimate of the prevalence and pattern of drug misuse, 
yet despite the importance of this information, a less than adequate 
picture has emerged. In this paper, divided into three sections, we attempt 
to layout and explore the assemblage of factors influencing drug misuse 
in Northern Ireland and subsequently our knowledge of it. In the first 
section we endeavor to demonstrate that drug use, distribution, and 
policy cannot be examined in isolation from the politics and practices of 
the protagonists to the conflict in Northern Ireland. In the second we 
critically review existing data on drug misuse ranging from the various 
public health and law enforcement indicators through to the limited 
empirical research available. The final section makes urgent calls for 
quality research in Northern Ireland that would be instrumental in 
influencing effective drug policy and practice. 
Introduction 
 Drug policies often are motivated by political rather than by public health concerns. 
Historically, drug policies about use and availability were influenced by the concern for control 
over markets or trade (Adams 1972; Bemdge and Edwards 1987; Partridge 1978). More recently, 
the relationship between drugs and politics was central to the controversy regarding U.S. Central 
Intelligence Agency and French secret service involvement in the heroin trade in Vietnam 
(McCoy et al. 1972) as well as U.S. relations with General Noriega (Chambliss 1989). Similarly, 
scholars have argued that the latest U.S. War on Drugs serves to justify the presence of U.S. 
military on foreign soil in the absence of a cold war (Elias 1993). Discussions have included 
“state sponsored” traders in drugs (Dorn and South 1990), narco-terrorism (Henze 1986), and the 
twin dangers of terrorism and drugs in the context of European Union integration (Clutterbuck 
1990), all part of what South (1995:419) referred to as the “blurred and murky activities such as 
drugs, money laundering, arms dealing, and political crime”. 
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 Domestically, moral panics about drugs have been linked with political competition and, in 
turn, policy both in the United States (Reinannan and Levine 1989) and in Israel (Ben-Yehuda 
1986). Drug policies have also been implemented in response to perceived threats of particular 
groups, often ethnic minorities. In the 1800s opium use among persons of Chinese descent was 
outlawed largely because of the concern over sexual relations between persons of Chinese 
descent and white Americans (Musto 1987). More recently, substantial differences in the amount 
 
of crack-cocaine and cocaine powder result in similar penalties under federal law in the United 
States, a policy that disproportionately affects African-Americans (Tonry 1994). Drug policies 
also serve to protect a particular class of people; federal treatment programs in the United States 
in the 1960s were implemented only after middle class youth were found to be using illicit drugs 
(Hanson et al. 1985). 
 These studies have rightly become part of the literature on drug abuse. However, despite 
the emergence of a vast and diverse literature on the political context of illicit drugs, little has 
been written about drugs in the context of Europe’s longest ongoing political conflict of this 
century. Northern Ireland. 
 Little work of a theoretical nature has been done on the relationship between the conflict in 
Northern Ireland and drugs other than the occasional article appearing in quality newspapers. The 
official discourse on drugs in Northern Ireland is that until the 1990s, unlike the Republic of 
Ireland, England, Wales, and Scotland, Northern Ireland did not have “a drugs problem.”1 That 
official discourse continues that from the 1990s onwards, and in particular during the period of 
the Irish Republican Army (IRA) cease-fire, a “rapidly growing drugs problem has emerged” 
(Northern Ireland Affairs Committee 1997:vii), largely based on the availability and use of 
“dance drugs,” primarily Ecstasy. Although some of these arguments may have greater validity 
than others, we seek to deconstruct that official discourse and to develop a more nuanced account 
of the drug scene. Given the paucity of research in the area, our work by its nature cannot be 
definitive, and although we have endeavored to check the authenticity of our information, the 
difficulties of access and verifiability for any researchers regarding drug use and supply are 
considerably amplified in a political conflict of the longevity and complexity of Northern Ireland. 
 The structure of this article is divided into three sections. First, we explore the question of 
drugs in relation to the ideology and practice of the three protagonists to the conflict. Second, we 
critically review existing data on illicit drugs in Northern Ireland. Finally, we offer suggestions 
for future research that might guide effective drug policy. 
The Protagonists to the Conflict and their Relationship to Drugs 
As Whyte (1990:vii) has suggested, relative to its size, the Northern Ireland conflict has meant 
that it is one of the most researched jurisdictions in the world, albeit not in the field of drugs. 
Below we offer a highly simplified outline of the principal protagonists to that conflict and 
attempt to draw out their various relationships with drug-related issues. This review is by no 
means comprehensive but rather an attempt to provide sufficient background information for 
readers less familiar with the complexities of Northern Ireland history and politics to make sense 
of the account. 
 On August 31,1994, the Army Council of the Provisional IRA called a unilateral cease-
fire, followed 1 month later by a similar declaration by the Combined Loyalist Military 
Command. Until that time Northern Ireland had experienced 25 years of political violence with 
the deaths of more than 3,200 people and tens of thousands injured and imprisoned. The IRA 
ended their cease-fire in February 1996 and reinstated it in July 1997. Although the main Loyalist 
paramilitary organizations have formally remained on ceasefire since 1994, they have killed a 
number of Catholic civilians over that period. The Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), the police 
force in Northern Ireland, have continued with their joint responsibility for the policing of 
“terrorist”2 crime (supported by the British Army and intelligence services) and “ordinary” crime 
such as drug- related offences. These three groups, Republicans, Loyalists, and the British State, 
are the armed protagonists to the conflict in Northern Ireland. 
Republican Paramilitaries 
 As detailed below, there are considerable differences in the relationship between various 
factions within the Republican movement and drugs and, consequently, these are dealt with 
separately. 
 
 
The Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) 
 The Provisional IRA is the largest and most well known Republican paramilitary group in 
Northern Ireland. They have conducted a campaign of political violence for more than 25years 
(interrupted by two major cease-fires) that has entailed bombings and shootings in Northern 
Ireland, Britain, and Europe (Bowyer Bell 1979; Coogan 1985; Bishop and Mallie 1989). These 
included attacks on security forces, political and judicial figures. Loyalists, and economic and 
non-military targets and, in the latter stages, broadening their concept of “legitimate targets” to 
include those who built for, or sold goods such as fruit or petrol, to the security forces (Kelly 
1988; O’Brien 1993). Their stated objective, at least until the 1994 cease-fire, was the 
reunification of the island of Ireland, and an end to British jurisdiction in the North of Ireland. 
However, their resumption of violence in 1996 appears to have been based on the failure of the 
British government to instigate inclusive all party talks (An Phoblacht 1996). Sinn Fern, the 
political wing of the IRA, received 15.47% of the overall vote, or 42% of the Nationalist vote in 
the elections held in May 1996 designed to pave the way for entrance to the all-party talks at 
Stormount. However, they had been refused entry to those talks, on the stated grounds that the 
IRA has not reinstated their cease-fire. 
 As well as engaging in a campaign against British security forces and other targets related 
to their overall military campaign, the Provisional ERA have also long been engaged in the 
“policing” of Republican areas against anti-social crime, including the supply of drugs.3 The IRA 
point to the inability or unwillingness of the RUC to police Republican areas; the actions of the 
latter in trying to recruit “informers” from among the ranks of petty criminals to pass information 
on suspected IRA activists (Helsinki Watch 1992; Munck 1988); the traditions of alternative 
justice systems in Ireland as a challenge to the legitimacy of the state (Kotsonouris 1994); and the 
pressure from local communities to act as justification for their actions (Sinn Fein 1996). The 
form of punishments administered have varied from beatings with iron bars and baseball bats 
studded with nails as well as shootings in the ankles, knees, and elbows (Kennedy 1995). 
Particularly notorious alleged offenders have been shot to death. 
 Despite the total cessation of “military activities” declared in September 1994, 
“punishment beatings” (without shootings) continued and apparently increased (Conway 1997). 
However, in April 1995, despite the cease-fire, a vigilante group calling itself Direct Acton 
Against Drugs (DAAD)4 began a series of murders of alleged drug dealers. That group was 
heavily criticized by the RUC, Unionist and Nationalist politicians, and the media as a ‘‘flag of 
convenience” for the IRA (Conway 1997; Hollywood 1997). The killings continued amid much 
controversy as to whether they entailed a breach of the cease-fire (Anderson 1996:3). 
 The political and ideological rationale of the IRA’s apparent decision to begin 
systematically killing drug dealers at that time is worth exploring in some detail. In the context of 
a highly disciplined cease-fire, and the efforts by Sinn Fein to galvanize national and international 
pressure upon a reluctant British government to call together the all-party peace talks, the 
organization decided to brave the inherent political risks in such a strategy. The authors have been 
told that they established a separate structure, under centralized command, taking the task of 
killing drug dealers outside the personnel and structure of the normal IRA “policing squads” and 
into the hands of individuals normally involved in the “military” campaign.5 
 
 One can see such an initiative on a number of levels. At a community level, there was 
certainly considerable concern about the perceived increase in drug misuse associated with the 
dance or rave scene that resulted in pressure on the ERA to react.6 From a military perspective, 
the IRA were also concerned at the inroads the RUC were able to make by recruiting informers 
connected to the drug scene that might hamper their ability to restart the military campaign if 
necessary. At the ideological level, despite its ostensible commitment to a supposed revolutionary 
and progressive ideology, the IRA has historically shared some of the most conservative views on 
the question of drugs and their control with British Ministers.8 Their social, political, and military 
fears of the potential of drugs, allied to their natural conservatism on the issue and the potential 
legitimacy and support to be garnered from being seen to be “acting on it,” encouraged the IRA to 
take political risks in the arena of drugs that they would not have taken in other arenas. 
 Given their rhetoric and policing activities, from the information we have been able to 
glean, it is not surprising that it would appear that the Provisional ERA have not been involved in 
any organized fashion in the sale or distribution of drugs in Northern Ireland. The government 
(Northern Ireland Office) by and large acknowledges that the IRA do not appear to be involved in 
the drug business. Citing research based on community perceptions with appropriate caveats, they 
conclude that: 
“Some perceived differences were registered between Loyalist and Republican 
groups. Loyalists were regarded as being less successful in distancing themselves 
from involvement both in terms of control and supply, and through personal use. 
Republican groups had been more successful” (Northern Ireland Affairs Committee 
1997:73). 
 Republican Socialist Groups and Drugs (Irish National Liberation Army [INLA] and Irish 
People’s Liberation Organisation [IPLO]) 
 The Republican movement in Ireland has contained an element that might be termed 
“Republican Socialism” since at least the end of the 19th century (Ryan 1948). The founding 
father of Irish Republican Socialism, James Connolly, believed that the question of national 
liberation from British rule could only be achieved in the context of a class based straggle, 
“national independence as the indispensable groundwork of industrial emancipation” (Connolly 
1987:311). In 1974 the INLA, explicitly donning the mantle of Connolly, was formed as the 
military wing of the Irish Republican Socialist Party (IRSP), intent upon continuing that tradition. 
Despite its ideological origins, almost since its inception the INLA has been marked by violent 
internal schisms, sectarian attacks against Protestant civilians, and, in the latter part of its 
existence, involvement in ordinary criminal activity including drug trafficking (Coogan 1995:277, 
Holland and McDonald 1994). 
 Due to their Leftist leanings, the 1NLA had established links with various Leftist groups in 
Europe, in particular in Holland and France (Bowyer Bell 1993). These contacts were originally 
used to obtain weapons but ultimately became supply routes for the importation of Ecstasy tablets 
from Amsterdam.1’ One of the schismatic splinter groups to emerge from the INLA was the IPLO 
and it was they who, according to the most authoritative source on the INLA and its derivatives 
(Holland and McDonald 1994), began the importation of large quantities of drugs into Northern 
Ireland. 
 Holland and McDonald (1994:317) argue that the IPLO was making such substantial 
profits from drugs that they actually met with members of the Loyalist paramilitary organizations 
(their principal targets for assassinations) in order to divide territory in Belfast, agreeing to 
assassinate smaller dealers who stood in their way (1994:317), They established a front taxi firm 
that was used the ferry drugs to various “raves” and discos around Belfast. After a series of 
bloody internal feuds, further sectarian killings, and continued activity in the drugs trade, the 
IPLO was finally disbanded when the IRA killed one leading member, shot several others in the 
knees, and warned the remaining members to disband or face further violence in a series of 
actions dubbed by the media as “the night of the long knives.” Although the INLA has continued 
to exist, despite its membership being further depleted by yet another internal feud during the 
IRA cease-fire, and while periodic reports appear in the media about the involvement of members 
and former members in the drug trade, particularly in the Republic of Ireland, it does not appear, 
based upon information from RUC, Republican, and media sources, that the same degree of 
infrastructure and organization exists as in the days previous to the disbandment of the IPLO. 
Loyalist Paramilitaries 
 The second group of protagonists to the conflict are the Loyalist paramilitaries, primarily 
the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) (Boulton 1973) and Ulster Defence Association (UDA) 
(Nelson 1984) and more recently the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF). Loyalist paramilitaries 
were responsible for the greatest number of deaths leading up to the 1994 cease-fires (McAuley 
 
1995). Their targets were traditionally uninvolved Catholic civilians, economic or civilian targets 
in the Irish Republic, or Republican activists (Bruce 1992). They regard themselves as primarily 
defensive in nature, driven to the use of political violence because of the IRA campaign, 
defending their community from the IRA and resisting their political aspiration to break the 
Union with Britain (Bruce 1995). In the elections to the all-party talks in 1996, the political 
parties associated with Loyalist paramilitarism, the Progressive Unionist Party and the Ulster 
Democratic Party, gained 5.69% of the votes and have continued to take their seat at the talks 
because of the continued cease-fire of the Loyalist paramilitaries. 
 Like Republicans, the relationship between Loyalist paramilitarism and drugs cannot be 
understood without reference to their ideology and politics, and their impact upon the 
organizational structure and quality of recruits. Loyalist paramilitaries are in essence a pro-state 
“terrorist” group (Wilkinson 1986), sharing the ideology and political aspirations of the state to 
maintain the Union with Britain (although ever mistrustful of British duplicity), but frustrated at 
the inability of the security services to confront the IRA and protect the Protestant community 
from them.10 Structurally the Loyalist paramilitaries, at least until the period of the ceasefires, 
have tended to be much less formalized and centralized than the IRA, built around strong 
personalities and control of particular territories rather than military or organizational ability 
(Bowyer Bell 1993; Bruce 1992). They regard themselves as coming from a highly individualistic 
culture, and will juxtapose the Protestant traditions of free thought and civil and religious liberties 
(and their own dislike for tight command structures) with the monotheism of Catholicism and the 
perceived automaton nature of IRA personnel, with their emphasis on collectivism, clear 
command structures, and firm control.” Consequently, there is a considerable degree of 
geographical autonomy among Loyalist paramilitary groups, particularly in the larger group (the 
UDA) and problems of internal discipline are endemic. 
 The Loyalist paramilitaries also engage in the informal policing of the working class areas 
from which they draw their support. They, too, lay claim to the policing of antisocial activities 
including petty crime and drug dealing (Combat 1994:4). However, although Loyalist punishment 
shootings outnumber those conducted by Republicans in virtually every year between 1986 and 
1994 (Kennedy 1995:70-71), it has been argued that the reasons are more complex and varied 
than might first appear (Hillyard 1985). Conway (1993) and Bell (1996) argue for example, that 
although young people who are punished by Republican paramilitaries are rarely associated with 
the Republican movement, punishment shootings and beatings on the Loyalist side are 
significantly about Loyalist organizations policing their own members. Young people in Loyalist 
areas engaged in “ordinary” criminal activity may be encouraged to “join up” or at the very least 
contribute a percentage of the proceeds obtained through criminal activity (Conway 1993:8). 
 Involvement in ordinary criminal activity has been a systematic problem for Loyalist 
paramilitaries since their inception (Dillon 1989). Paramilitarism creates significant potential for, 
at the very least, suspicions of self-enrichment. As Bruce (1995:131) has argued, “..when money 
is raised by the bank-robbing, extortion, prostitution, and the sale of drugs and pornography...the 
temptation is for some of it to stick to the fingers of those who raise it.” It has been suggested that 
the lower quality of Loyalist recruits, both in terms of the sophistication of their military 
activities, and their propensity for ordinary criminal activities, may be at least in part accounted 
for by their pro-state position. Bruce (1992:272-273), the primary researcher on Loyalist 
paramilitarism, argues at one point in his book that unlike committed Republicans, if one wishes 
to fight to maintain the Union in Northern Ireland, one can Join the “legitimate” state forces (i.e., 
the RUC or the Royal Irish Rangers, the locally recruited regiment of the British army) for better 
pay and more respectable lifestyle. Therefore, generally, Loyalist paramilitaries will recruit lesser 
quality individuals. 
 
 The result of these factors is that there is a widespread belief in Northern Ireland, tacitly 
acknowledged by Loyalist political spokespersons12, that Loyalist paramilitaries are involved in 
the selling and distribution of illegal drugs in Northern Ireland. Their involvement appears to vary 
based on geography, faction, and the strength and personalities of the local leadership.13 Although 
there have been some attempts to eradicate the practice, and persistent warnings in Loyalist 
paramilitary magazines for those involved to desist (Combat 1996), the practice is apparently 
continuing (Bruce 1995; McKittrick 1994: Winston 1997). 
The British State in Northern Ireland 
The State as Armed Protagonist 
 As noted above, the third group of armed protagonists engaged in the conflict are those 
representing the British state, namely the Royal Ulster Constabulary, British army, and a range of 
intelligence agencies14. The British state has engaged militarily in a variety of ways from open 
confrontation between British soldiers and the IRA in the 1970s (Barthop 1976; Hamill 1985), to 
the policy known as “Ulsterisation” that put the RUC on the front line from 1976 (Ryder 1989) 
and sought to contain the role of the army as much as possible, to the locally recruited Ulster 
Defence Regiment (Ryder 1991), with support from specialist squads such as the Special Air 
Service engaged in covert ambushes (Dillon 1990). The RUC has throughout that penod had the 
dual function of policing ordinary crimes including drugs as well as political violence associated 
with the Loyalist and Republican campaigns. They have vigorously resisted any suggestion of 
“two-tier policing” that would entail separating these functions (Brogden 1995), arguing instead 
for the continuation of one monolithic police force that deals will all crime, regardless of its 
nature.15 The role of the RUC in relation to drugs in Northern Ireland is discussed in some detail 
below. 
State Policy on Drugs and the Conflict 
 It would be erroneous to give the impression that all aspects of civil administration (such as 
drug policy) in Northern Ireland have been driven by a strategy based upon the British state’s 
military, ideological, and political needs with regard to conflict. Below we offer considerable 
detail of the nature of governmental response to drugs in Northern Ireland. In general terms there 
is a vigorous debate within Northern Ireland as to whether or not state policy and the range of 
areas within civil administration are affected by the conflict. Some scholars, in areas where one 
would expect a direct relationship such as joyriding, pay scant attention to the structural impact 
and causes of the conflict in relation to state policy (e.g., Kilpatnck 1988). Others, largely from 
within an anti-imperialist framework, argue with varying degrees of subtlety that tactical changes 
of policy across a wide spectrum can be viewed within a context of “strategic continuity” of 
facilitating capital growth by fomenting working class sectarianism and preserving the territorial 
integrity of the British State (Martin 1982). Others argue that British policy is neither wholly 
rational nor consistent (Bew et al. 1995), are is characterized as “inconsistent” (O’Malley 1983). 
Still others offer something of a middle ground, walthough holding a more pluralist view of the 
state, they nonetheless argue that there are salient features in security policy, political initiatives, 
and other aspects of state policy that may be drawn out and thematized (Boyle and Hadden 1985; 
O’Leary and McGarry 1995). 
 Although we would reject the narrow determinism offered by some anti-impenalist 
commentators, we suggest that state policy and practice on drugs has to some extent been 
influenced by factors relating to the political conflict. We will argue that with regard to politically 
contentious issues such as the contested legitimacy of the RUC, the period of the cease-fires, and 
the arguable occurrence of a moral panic around the use of Ecstasy and the dance culture, and 
government’s political and ideological desire to find areas of common ground where agreement 
can be reached between the Republicans and Loyalists, drugs cannot be artificially separated from 
the conflict. 
The Legitimacy of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and the Potential for a Drug Moral 
Panic 
 The RUC is over 90% Protestant and male.16 It has had a controversial history since its 
inception with the formation of the state (Farrell 1983; Ryder 1989; Weitzer 1995), accused at 
various junctures of nakedly sectarian policing (Farrell 1980), torture (Taylor 1980), and of 
 
operating beyond the rule of law to the point of collusion with Loyalist paramilitaries (Amnesty 
International 1994). 
 Despite these criticisms, public attitudes toward the police, as evidenced in several public 
attitude surveys had, until recently, remained broadly positive (Northern Ireland Office 
1996a:118). The possible reasons for that puzzling uniformity of views are explored below, but 
has been challenged by two recent studies suggesting marked differences in attitudes toward and 
expectations of the police between Catholics and Protestants17 (O’Mahony et al. 1998; Police 
Authority of Northern Ireland 1996). 
 The RUC Drug Intelligence Unit was formed in 197018 (Royal Ulster Constabulary 1970). 
A perusal of the Chief Constable annual reports over the past 25 years showed that until the 
1990s, cannabis was the most common drug about which concern was expressed. By 1995, 
Ecstasy was cited as “the most popular” drug (RUC 1995:6). For a 3-year period prior to 1995, 
each annual report contained the same paragraph about drug misuse, that is, that illicit drug use 
was not a major problem in Northern Ireland. In 1995, however, the annual report noted that drug 
misuse was “becoming a problem” and drugs were considered to be an “insidious threat” (RUC 
1995:193). With substantial increases in staff, the threat of police redundancies in light of the 
cease-fires appeared to recede (Hollywood 1997). There also is considerable evidence, at least 
historically, that there is substance to the allegations of the RUC using petty criminals as 
informers upon suspected paramilitary activists.19 
 It may be that considerably more drugs may have become available because of the cease-
fires; thus warranting a shift in emphasis for their resources. Our point, however, is that one 
cannot ignore the symbolic and political significance of the drug issue. It has great potential for 
healing the difficult relationship between sections of the Catholic community and the police in 
Northern Ireland.20 Similarly in the political arena where the Unionist and Nationalist political 
parties find it so difficult to agree on anything, and where the Political Affairs Department of the 
Northern Ireland Office spends considerable time trying to fashion a common ground, everyone 
can be “against drugs.” The difficulty is that the potent combination of the police, government, 
political parties, and a supportive media (Hollywood 1997) are all the necessary ingredients for a 
moral panic from which it can be difficult to separate reality from fiction. 
 As noted at the beginning of this section, we do not support a reductionist view of the state 
or its agencies where all actions in the arena of drugs are driven by the dynamics of the conflict. 
The relationship between the state and civil society in the north of Ireland is much more complex 
than such a view would permit and there are numerous non-governmental agencies and 
individuals who are influential in this field. Nonetheless, we would argue that the factors outlined 
above must be borne in mind when considering the evidence on prevalence of drug misuse as 
outlined using the various measures described below. 
Extent of Drug Misuse in Northern Ireland 
 We have a far from adequate picture of the extent and patterning of illicit drug use in 
Northern Ireland. To our knowledge, studies of drug misuse (largely surveys of youth) did not 
emerge until 1992. Similar to other locations, drug-use indicators represented through official or 
survey data are plagued with vahdity problems. These data limitations are compounded in the 
north of Ireland where the political situation affects nearly every aspect of research methodology, 
including access and sampling issues, data collection, as well as the reporting of results. In this 
section, we examine multiple indicators of drug use (i.e., public health and law enforcement 
indicators and existing research) in Northern Ireland and also report the limitations of these data 
that are specific to the overall conflict. 
Public Health Indicators 
 Public health officials in the north did not consider drug misuse to be a major social 
problem prior to the 1990s. As late as 1986 the Department of Health and Social Services 
(DHSS) claimed that drug prevention and education strategies were not necessary in Northern 
 
Ireland because of the [apparent] “relative low level of drug misuse” (Northern Ireland 
Committee on Drug Misuse 1995:5). This policy was guided largely by public health indicators 
rather than by research and these data are discussed below. 
Notifications 
Physicians are required to notify in writing the Chief Medical Officer of the DHSS if they attend 
a patient whom they consider to be, or have reasonable grounds to suspect is, addicted to any of 
the specified controlled drugs. Subsequently, this information is fed into the National Home 
Office Addict notification system. The limitations of this official Home Office system are well 
understood (Hartnoll et al. 1985; Hay and McKeganey 1996). The register refers only to use of 
the 14 opioids and cocaine, thereby overlooking other controlled drugs such as benzodiazepines. 
Reporting inconsistencies have also been documented. First, despite guidelines that attempt to 
define addiction, the initial determination still requires some subjectivity on the part of 
physicians. An evaluation of the notification system in the mid-1980s, for example, found that 
only one in four drug addicts actually known to medical practitioners were reported (Strang and 
Shah 1985). Second, Mott (1994) claimed that increases in notifications are in part due to greater 
compliance with regulations among physicians. If so, analyzing trends is problematic. Third, 
some users fail to seek medical attention for drug problems at all because they do not wish to be 
reported (Institute for the Study of Drug Dependence 1989). This issue has special implications in 
Northern Ireland. Despite assurances of confidentiality, considerable evidence suggests that petty 
offenders from republican and loyalist areas are sought by police to serve as informers whereby 
police withhold arrest in exchange for information on paramilitary activities (Weitzer 1995). 
Other reports claim that police regularly collect demographic information, including health 
records, relating to the nationalist population (Metress 1995). In the interests of security, no data 
are confidential. These claims may affect the validity of notification data in that persons may be 
less likely to seek treatment for drug abuse simply to avoid police exploitation. 
 Notification data have been supplemented by the creation of regional drug misuse 
databases (RDMDs) that require a range of service providers including medical services, 
specialist drug services (statutory and non-statutory), and penal institutions to report contacts with 
drug users who attend their services. A comparison of the number of individuals notified to the 
Home Office and those reported to RDMDs whose main drug of addiction was a notifiable drug 
suggests that the RDMDs already perform better than the Home Office in most regions (Haw et 
al. 1994a). 
 Table 1 presents data from the Home Office addict notification system for Northern 
Ireland, Scotland, and England and Wales. The data include both total registrations and new 
notifications. Although the small numbers for Northern Ireland are immediately apparent, it is 
also evident that Northern Ireland has a notable percentage increase in the number of new 
notifications between 1991 and 1995. A •further rise in notifications for Northern Ireland is 
observed in 1996 when the total number of registered addicts increased to 119. Additionally, 46 
new notifications in 1996 represents a threefold increase m new notifications since 1991. 
However, these figures should be treated with caution as the low baseline rate in the north of 
Ireland inflates percentage increases. 
Injection Drug Use 
 Notification data indicate that heroin remains the main drug of misuse officially recorded 
m Northern Ireland. Figures for 1993, 1994 and 1995 indicate 46, 55, and 61 notifications, 
respectively, for misuse of( diamorphme) heroin, with many of the addicts reporting injection of 
the drug. There were also a small number of notifications for other opiates such as 
dextromoramide (palfium) and dipipanone (diconal). Studies elsewhere have noted the 
association between use of these drugs and injecting (Haw et al. 1996; Peters et al. 1994). 
Additionally, between 1990 and 1994, 19 persons died of opiate-related causes, yet no deaths 
 
from opiate use were recorded m 1995 (R. Phipps, Health Promotion Agency of Northern Ireland, 
personal communication 1997). 
Table 1 
Registered Addicts and New Notifications in Northern Ireland, and in Scotland, England, 
and Wales 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Percentage 
Increase 
Registered addicts 
Northern Irelanda 
51 60 80 87 96 88
Scotlandb 1,499 1,849 2,220 3,691 3,542 136
England and Walesb 19,289 22,819 25,706 28,224 33,583 74
New notifications 
Northern Irelanda 
11 23 32 29 24 118
Scotlandb 727 868 1,045 1,813 1,464 101
England and Walesb 7,271 8,776 10,490 11,633 13,249 82
a Figures from the Northern Ireland Register of Drug Addicts (Belfast). 
b Tigures from the Home Office Register of Drug Addicts (London). 
 Yet thus far, official information together with anecdotal assertions suggest that Northern 
Ireland does not have a significant injecting culture and the attendant health risks associated with 
injection practices. This issue was noted by O’Neill (1995) who using a case study approach, 
researched a small sample of drug users in Belfast who were not in contact with treatment 
services. Several of his subjects made note of the fact that there was not an established heroin or 
injecting culture within Northern Ireland, yet added that this may be related to lack of availability 
of “hard drugs.” O’Neill also reported the slow beginnings oftemazepam use among some of his 
subjects. Other indicators often, although not always reflective of trends in injecting drug use, are 
HIV infection and Hepatitis B and C prevalence rates. Northern Ireland, even without specific 
drug harm-reduction services in place, has one of the lowest known HTV rates within the United 
Kingdom and by 1996 had only 6 of a cumulative total of 147 cases of HIV-1 infection cited as 
having injection drug use as the probable mode of transmission (Public Health Laboratory 
Service 1996). Furthermore, it cannot be assumed that the virus was contracted in Northern 
Ireland. Similarly, the known rates of Hepatitis B and C remain relatively low. In the south of 
Ireland, 43% of persons diagnosed with AIDS (data for HIV-l infection were not available) 
through 1995 reportedly are injecting drug users (written correspondence from the Department of 
Health Services, Dublin 1997). As with any statistics, trends in these reports must be treated with 
caution as the diagnosis of HIV infection in an asymptomatic person depends upon risk 
recognition, willingness to be tested, and test accessibility. Research specifically addressing 
injection drug use, even when targeted at small numbers, is necessary in order to examine trends 
and patterns of use, in addition to factors that influence risk behavior. 
 Caveats around interpretation of all such data are imperative. For example, when the 
number of newly recorded addicts rises it is unclear whether this increase is indicative of the fact 
that a higher proportion of addicts are receiving help or highlights a need for concern by 
suggesting that there are more addicts in need of assistance. That fluctuations in these statistics 
reflect corresponding patterns in the overall level of drug misuse in Northern Ireland hinges upon 
an invalidated assumption that each year approximately the same proportion of addicts come to 
light. Given the lack of empirical research, even if research were occurring, it is difficult to 
effectively factor into the equation the effects of changes in enforcement priorities, prescribing 
policies, medical practitioner compliance with the reporting system, supply networks, and 
changes in drug users themselves, not least of which is how many are not presenting themselves 
to medical practitioners and for what reasons. 
 
 Multiplier techniques have been applied to Home Office registers elsewhere in the United 
Kingdom. Hartnoll et al. (1985) tentatively suggested that there were five regular users of heroin 
and similar drugs in the population for each user notified to the Home Office as an addict. Further 
multipliers ranging from 2 to 10 have been used throughout the United Kingdom (Crowe 1988; 
Ditton and Speiritis 1982; Segar1992). 
 O’Neill’s (1995) study added weight to the conclusion that not all addicts in Northern 
Ireland are in contact with treatment services and, therefore, remain hidden. He reported that 
users were reticent about approaching the addiction services and that statutory and voluntary 
addiction services in Belfast at the time of his study were seen as stigmatizing and anti-drug use, 
per se. O’Neill also found that many of the subjects reported that they would have “difficulty 
approaching [treatment services] due to actual experience of the services or due to hearsay about 
the type of treatment or services on offer” (1995:68). 
 Pattison et al. (1982), in attempting to establish prevalence, had difficulty in locating an 
area in northeast England where there were enough ‘problem drug users’ to merit the effort of 
attempting to count them. These sentiments are probably reflected at present in Northern Ireland 
and are indicative of the fact that research into drug misuse is likely to target areas or populations 
with a visible problem or at those deemed particularly at risk. It is important to bear in mind that 
although there is no overwhelming reason to suggest that Northern Ireland is at greater risk than 
anywhere else, it would be foolish to assume that it is somehow entirely immune and, therefore, 
would be well served by empirical research that confirms or refutes anecdotal evidence. 
 In summation, the limited empirical research, anecdotal evidence, and official statistics for 
Northern Ireland point to a relatively small opiate and injection problem and would indicate that 
the use of any multiplier for estimating the rate for Northern Ireland would be misleading at this 
juncture. It would nonetheless be pragmatic to acknowledge that not all addicts are known. The 
true extent of general or injecting use of these and other drugs such as Temazepam is as yet 
unexplored and the potential for further increases in the general and injecting use must also be 
considered. 
 Whatever kind of prevalence data are required in addition to official statistics, there is a 
consensus that detailed information on demographics (Peveler et al. 1988), patterns of drug use 
(Darke et al. 1991) and qualitative information on the dynamics of drug taking (Diaz and Anas 
1992; Hartnoll 1992; Haw et al. 1994b; McKeganey et al. 1995) are extremely important. 
Treatment 
 As of January 1997, 51 organizations provided some type of rehabihtative or support 
services for persons with drug or alcohol problems (Research Group on Chemical Dependency 
1996). Most organizations provide out-patient counseling, advice, and/or education services. One 
agency only focuses exclusively on prevention of HTV and offers support services for persons 
infected with HIV. 
 The majority of programs operate during daytime hours only. Ten programs provide 
residential 24-hour treatment for drug and alcohol abuse, yet only three residential programs 
operate in Belfast, the largest city in the region, and one of these programs exclusively serves 
homeless males with drug or alcohol problems. 
 There are no methadone clinics in the north. In fact, local health guidelines state that 
methadone “cannot be regarded as an effective or advisable regime in the management of 
addiction” (Department of Health and Social Services 1992). 
 Comprehensive data are lacking on treatment utilization. Intake data from most programs 
do not differentiate between drug and alcohol admissions so that these data provide limited 
information on trends. Demand for residential treatment is not high at least in terms of waiting 
lists; a few programs do have waiting lists but rarely do lists exceed 10 persons at any one time. 
Waiting lists, however, may be a poor indicator of treatment needs in Northern Ireland. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that some users wish to avoid the stigma associated with drug use and, 
 
therefore, may be less inclined to seek treatment. Further, the perception that police recruit drug 
users as informants might also affect treatment utilization. 
Law Enforcement Indicators 
 Prior to 1990, drug seizures by police or Customs were minimal and rarely were reported 
by the media. More recently, seizures of certain drugs have been noteworthy in comparison with 
previous years. Although seizures of illicit drugs are often poor indicators of demand and supply 
(South 1995; Stimson 1985), these events now capture considerable media attention in the north 
(Hollywood 1996). Moreover, police officials have drawn inferences about the demand for drugs 
based on seizures. For example, the lead officer of the RUC Drug Squad recently issued his report 
to a governing committee. Citing seizure data he noted that: “... the demand [emphasis added] for 
illicit drugs has been growing...” (Irish News 1996). 
 Table 2 presents drug seizure data reported by the RUC for the years 1985 to 1995. The 
data suggest that increases in the amount of Ecstasy seized were noted first in 1991, but that 
substantial increases were reported in 1994 for cannabis, LSD, Ecstasy, amphetamines, and 
cocaine. In 1995, seizures of cannabis and Ecstasy continued to show an upward trend. 
 Similarly, drug offenses (possession and trafficking) recorded by the RUC for the years 
1992 to 1995 (table 3) the first major increase occurred in 1994. A total of 1,286 drug offenses 
were recorded for 1994, compared with 811 in 1993 and 619 in 1992 (Royal Ulster Constabulary 
1994, 1993, 1992). In 1994, 12% of the drug offenses were for trafficking rather than possession. 
Similarly, trafficking offenses accounted for 10% of all drug offenses in 1989 (data not shown). 
Drug offenses continued to increase somewhat in 1995 (,V=1,426), but during that year 
trafficking offenses accounted for the largest proportion of drug offenses ever (25%). Since 1992, 
no increases in recorded offenses were reported for robbery, burglary, or theft. 
Table 2 
Seizures by Drug Category and by Year 
Drug Category 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Carmabis    
Resin (kilograms) 16a 18a 6a 13a 22a 38 39 16 45 89 116
Plants  5 19 0 419 6 634
Ecstasy    
(tablets) 0 0 0 0 0 0 2,711 4,408 2,923 23,853 136,860
Powder (grams) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 168 0
LSD    
Grams 0 0 0 0 18 0 0 0 0 0 0
Doses 903 559 500 917 485 573 800 9,201 8,022 15,484 8,761
Amphetamines (kilograms) <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 <1 6 2 11 7
Opiates    
Grams 90 0 196 <1 25 0 1 20 363 34 4
Doses 0 7 0 0 1,05
2
2,757 250 57 0 0 0
Cocaine (grins) 6 0 98 <1 52 0 88 77 19 1,092 322b
Note: LSD - lysergic acid diothylamide. 
 
Table 3 
Royal Ulster Constabulary Recorded Offences, 1992-95 
Offence Category 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Drug possession and trafficking 619 811 1,286 1,426 
Robbery 1,851 1,723 1,567 1,539 
Burglary 17,117 15,735 16,902 16,457 
Theft 34,256 33,161 33,233 33,472 
 Because notable increases in drug seizures and drug offenses coincided with the 1994 
cease-fires, we suggest the possibility that these increases reflect a change in police activity rather 
than an indication of a demand for drugs. In 1994 the RUC employed 13,183 officers. The rate of 
full-time officers per capita was three times higher in Northern Ireland than in England and Wales 
and twice as high as metropolitan areas in England (data presented in Northern Ireland Office 
1996a: 109). The advent of the ceasefires altered the role of police considerably. In previous 
years, police resources largely were allocated to the overall security situation, including the 
prevention and investigation of terrorist offenses, yet by 1995 the number of arrests under the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act and the Emergency Provisions Act21 had declined considerably (Irish 
News 1995). The area’s rate of “ordinary decent crime22” one of the lowest described in two 
international crime victimization studies (Van Dijk and Mayhew 1993) hardly required more 
police attention. Thus, the ceasefires that commenced in 1994 raised the question: How would 
government justify the large number of police officers in a post-conflict situation? Indeed, some 
reports indicated that police personnel were seeking employment elsewhere (Cadwallader 1995). 
 Hollywood (1997) interviewed senior drug squad officers and analyzed local media content 
and concluded that the cease-fires changed the focus of police expenditures so that more time, 
effort, and monetary resources were designated for investigating the illicit drug trade. He noted 
that: 
“Within three months of the cease-fires, at a time when police redundancies were 
being mentioned in the press, the RUC Drug Squad was augmented by 52 officers, 
plus five new ‘Drug Liaison Units’ (ensuring dozens of other jobs) set up in regional 
towns” (1997:67). 
An alternative explanation is that the demand for drugs. Ecstasy in particular, has increased and 
that the increases in seizures and drug offenses reflects the growing demand. If the demand 
exceeds the supply we might expect drug prices to increase. Street sources, however, suggest that 
the cost of cannabis has not increased in approximately 15 years although marketing selection is 
more limited at present. Further, the cost of Ecstasy has declined from £25 per tab in 1991 to £8 
to £9 per tab in some areas of Belfast. These figures suggest that demand does not exceed supply 
although it is also possible that a limited supply has led dealers to reduce the purity rather than 
increase the price (Farrell et al. 1996). Unfortunately, research on drug purity levels has not been 
conducted. 
Self-Report Surveys 
By 1998, approximately 12 self-report surveys of drug misuse have been conducted in the north 
of Ireland. Most surveys focused on samples of youth, or young adults and all were administered 
between 1992 and the present. These survey prevalence rates ranged from 13% (Health 
Promotion Agency for Northern Ireland 1995) to 52 percent (West Belfast Economic Forum 
1996) for lifetime use of .any illicit drug. The one study published in the academic literature 
found a lifetime prevalence rate of 26% (any drug use) among school children in Northern Ireland 
 
(McCMiller and Plant 1996). Results from this study also showed that prevalence rates in 
Northern Ireland were somewhat lower than rates in England, Wales, and Scotland, particularly 
among female youth. Vast methodological and geographical differences make comparisons 
difficult. However, all youth surveys showed that cannabis was used most often and that smaller 
numbers of youth had used LSD or Ecstasy. Further, all studies showed extremely low prevalence 
rates for cocaine or heroin use (i.e., 2% or less). 
 Most of the self-report studies are’ plagued with methodological limitations. Nevertheless, 
local media have responded with alarming headlines. One recent news article, Ulster Children in 
Drugs Shock (Belfast Telegraph 1997:3) reported results from the latest self-report study 
conducted by a community organization wherein 61% of youth aged 12 to 17 reportedly had tried 
illicit drugs. However, a second newspaper suggested that, “The reality [of drug misuse among 
youth] is far removed from that hysterical headline” (Andersonstown News 1997). 
 Questions about drug misuse were included in two surveys that focused largely on samples 
of adults. Data for the Northern Ireland Crime Survey were collected between October 1993 and 
January 1995, dates that were pre-ceasefire and post ceasefire. Persons aged 16 to 59 were 
included. Results indicate a lifetime prevalence rate of 20 percent for any illicit drug use, 
cannabis included (Northern Ireland Office 1996b). In comparison, the British Crime Survey, 
which included respondents from England and Wales and was administered during the same 
approximate time period, revealed a lifetime prevalence rate of 28% (Ramsey and Percy 1996). 
Prevalence rates for drug categories were similar in both surveys with the exception of cannabis 
(Northern Ireland=12%; England and Wales=21%). Although some people in Northern Ireland 
admitted having used cocaine, heroin, and methadone, the numbers were so low as to register 
under 0.05%. An attitudinal survey of adults, administered post-ceasefire, found that 
approximately 10% of respondents had used cannabis (Jardine 1997). In comparison, data 
reported from the British Attitude Survey found that 21% of respondents had used cannabis 
(Gould et al. 1996). 
 It is by now well documented that the nature of illicit drug use renders its prevalence 
difficult to detect using survey methods (Haw et al. 1994a). National surveys are usually founded 
on household units derived from the census and people not based in houses simply fail to be 
picked up by the research. Prisoners, travelers, students, and institutionalized and hopeless people 
are typically excluded from national or regional surveys of drug misuse. Surveys are subject to 
limitations, other than sampling error, including the assumption that all individuals within the 
population sampled are equally prepared to admit having taken illicit drugs, m fact, studies 
suggest that that drug use is admitted by respondents (Maddux and Desmond 1975), willingness 
to do so decreases in inverse proportion to the perceived deviance of the activity. After reviewing 
self-report studies, Harrison (1995) concluded that cannabis use is generally admitted, but use of 
heroin less so. The characteristics of respondent and interviewer are also likely to have an impact 
on the validity of self-reported behavior. Young interviewers for example tend to elicit higher 
rates of drug use among young respondents than older interviewers (Reuband 1992). In addition, 
other characteristics such as gender, social class, religion, and ethnicity are also likely to have an 
impact. The limitations of survey data are exacerbated in the north of Ireland and these problems 
are discussed below. 
The Politics of Counting 
 Extensive political conflict in the north of Ireland has tremendous implications for drug 
misuse data Various social and political phenomena have been studied in Northern Ireland 
(Whyte 1990) to the extent that some residents may suffer from survey fatigue. The annual Social 
Attitude Survey shows rather consistent response rates that range from 66% to 71% since 1989. A 
similar response rate (72%)23 was observed for the Northern Ireland Crime Survey (Northern 
Ireland Office 1996b). These response rates are acceptable by social science standards, yet little is 
known about the characteristics of persons who refused to participate. The possibility for sample 
selection bias is increased if either those who use drugs or persons who abstain are 
 
disproportionately represented among excluded persons. Additionally, despite assurances of 
confidentially some users of illicit drugs might not be willing to disclose this information for fear 
that they will be identified to informal and justice systems. 
 From an official perspective, there have been considerable efforts in recent years to portray 
the “normality” of life in Northern Ireland, emphasizing high levels of satisfaction with the RUC 
(Northern Ireland Office 1996), that individuals were considerably more likely to be killed in a 
traffic accident than by terrorism, the perceived strength of family and community (Northern 
Ireland Home Page 1996), and high church attendance (Belfast Telegraph 1996:11). The views 
and experiences of this idealized “average” citizen, and by extension, communities are often 
juxtaposed to the incomprehensibility of the activities of the “tiny minority of men of violence,” 
obfuscating any structural links between violence, the state, and the deeply divided communities. 
Although such portrayals of “reality” may reflect the daily lives of some citizens, there are 
substantial variances across socioeconomic, religious, and geographic boundaries in Northern 
Ireland (O’Mahony et al. 1997). 
 Previous research on drug misuse has found that interviewer traits at times affect responses 
to survey questions about drug misuse (Reuband 1992). Equally important is the possibility of 
interaction effects that emerge from the dynamics of the interview setting. For example, we are 
unaware of any research that has examined interaction effects of interviewer and respondent 
characteristics, such as class, gender, and religion. 
 Our review of the self-report studies of youth found that several of the reports estimated 
prevalence incorrectly. In one study, cited often by policy makers, revalence was calculated with 
the numerator, “number of drugs used by the entire sample,” failing to note that drug use 
categories are not mutually exclusive, i.e., some persons use more than one drug. In other studies, 
prevalence was not calculated at all, but authors highlighted the number of persons who used a 
particular drug as a percentage of the number of persons who used any drug. These calculations 
inflate “prevalence,” alarm media, and perhaps contribute to inappropriate policy. 
 We experienced several difficulties in our attempts to obtain drug misuse data for this 
article. For example, some self-report studies were either “no longer available” or could not be 
located by the staff of the agency that sponsored the survey. We requested prescription data and 
learned that monthly reports that summarize these data are distributed to physicians. We were 
told, however, that the author of the reports does not keep copies. We also requested seizure data 
by month from the RUC but were told that this information was not maintained by the police. 
Annual seizure data were readily available, which prompted us to wonder how the yearly data 
were compiled in the first place. Perhaps because so few studies of drug misuse have been 
conducted here due to preoccupation with research in other fields, persons with access to 
information are highly suspicious of persons who seek to obtain data. 
Conclusion 
 Considerable emphasis has been placed in Northern Ireland as elsewhere upon providing 
an estimate of the prevalence and pattern of drug misuse. Despite the importance of such 
information and obvious concern for drug misuse, which is reflected in the often dramatized press 
coverage, we have a far from adequate picture of the true extent and patterning of illicit drug use 
in Northern Ireland. 
 As we have gone to considerable lengths to demonstrate, drug use, distribution, and policy 
cannot be examined in isolation from the politics, ideology, and practices of the protagonists to 
the conflict in Northern Ireland. Only with such a backdrop can the normal methods of drug 
research be undertaken, analyzed, and understood. 
 The limited empirical research prompted us to examine multiple indicators of illicit drug 
use. The validity of drug use indicators as measured by official data and surveys has been 
questioned elsewhere and it is difficult to ascertain to what extent these limitations may apply to 
the various Northern Ireland indicators. However, it is our contention that the context of the 
political conflict, the questionable techniques employed in some studies, and the possible vested 
 
interests in high rates of prevalence, may serve to amplify methodological flaws and the 
consequent results in drug research. 
 With those concerns in mind, if as the existing sources suggest, illicit drug use in the north 
of Ireland is substantively lower than in neighboring jurisdictions, explanations for this finding 
must be located within the context of the range of epistemological axioms about the political, 
cultural, ideological, and social norms that prevail in Northern Ireland. 
 For once we feel that we can approach the issue of calling for more research with clear 
consciences. Effective policy formulation should be based upon solid ethnographic work on illicit 
drug use on a range of populations. Longitudinal research on illicit drug use has yet to be 
conducted here and these data would greatly benefit policy formulation. Studies of injectors and 
drug lifestyle risk behaviors for HIV are also lacking. The official discourse maintains that the 
number of injecting drug users is extremely low, yet street sources suggest active pockets in at 
least two regional towns. Given the proximity of large injecting communities in Glasgow, 
Edinburgh, Dublin, and London, research is needed to investigate explanations for the apparent 
lack of an injecting culture and also to examine the treatment needs and utilization and risk 
behaviors in the absence of methadone maintenance and needle exchange programs. 
 Finally, one of most obvious consequences of the lack of knowledge in Northern Ireland is 
that it leaves the field open to wishful thinking, anecdotal assertions, and inaccurate guesswork 
that disproportionately impact upon policy, service planning, and delivery. 
Notes 
1. For example in 1986 the Northern Ireland Committee on Drug Misuse (NICDM), an advisory 
body on illicit drugs to the Northern Ireland Department of Health and Services, advised the 
department that a low profile approach to public education and prevention was appropriate in 
view of “the relatively low level of drug misuse” in Northern Ireland (Northern Ireland Affairs 
Committee 1997 :vii). 
2. The use of the word terrorist in this article is in line with the definition advanced in the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act 1991 (as amended). Section 66 of which defines terrorism as “..the 
use or threat of violence for political ends.” For a discussion on the difficulties of accurately 
defining the term see Teichman (1989) and Wardlaw (1989). 
3. Republicans have also been involved in anti-drug campaigns in the Republic of Ireland, 
particularly the Concern Parents Against Drugs in Dublin in the 1980s and its more recent 
manifestations (McCullagh 1996). The activities of such groups have included public forums 
where offenders were permitted to defend themselves, disruptive tactics designed to make drug 
dealing more difficult in various areas of the city, evictions, and some beatings (Bennett 1988). 
4. Interestingly, during the same year (1995) the government implemented the Central Co-
ordinating Group for Action Against Drugs (emphasis added). 
5. Confidential Republican source. 
6. Hollywood (1997), argues convincingly that much of that concern was encouraged by a range 
of moral entrepreneurs including the media, RUC, politician sand paramilitaries, using the “drugs 
menace” to fill the vacuum hitherto occupied by discourses on the political conflict. 
7. “In order to fulfil a political agenda of demoralising the nationalist people the RUC has 
systematically recruited anti-social and criminal elements, including drug sealers, from within the 
Nationalist community to act as informers. In return a blind eye has been turned to their illegal 
activities. In many case they have been encouraged in those activities as a means of lowering 
nationalists confidence and morale” (An Phoblacht [Republican News] 1996). 
8. In pledging to eradicate drugs, G. Company of the Belfast Brigade of the IRA referred to drugs 
in the community [at that time primarily marijuana] as “..the poison of our community, the rotten 
apple which corrupts all around it” (Burton 1978). Similarly in more recent times, despite the 
restart of the IRA’s campaign of violence, one of the most contentious motions at the recent Sirm 
Fein Ard Fheis (Annual Convention) was a proposal to add the decriminalization of cannabis to 
the party’s manifesto. 
 
9. One former INLA activist now living in Amsterdam is repeatedly named in investigative 
journalist accounts of drugs in Ireland as one of the principal supplier of drugs to Ireland. These 
accounts, largely based upon Irish police sources and contacts within the Dublin criminal 
underworld, allege that this individual flies his private jet to South America to pick up drugs 
bound for the Irish market. 
10. They have also apparently been motivated, at times, with deep rooted sectarian hatred of 
Catholics which has led them to engage in some of the most horrific and ritualistic of murders 
(Dillon 1989). 
11. Interview with former U.V.F life sentenced prisoner, September 1996. 
12. “I am not going to say that no [Loyalist J paramilitaries are involved in drugs. I don’t know 
whether they are or not. 1 do know however that any Loyalist involved in drug dealing is not 
doing it with the blessing of the paramilitary leadership. “ Councillor Hugh Smyth, Progressive 
Unionist Party, (political wing of the Ulster Volunteer Force) in the Forum Debate on Drugs in 
Northern Ireland (reported in Irish News 1997). 
13. Interview with Loyalist political activist December 18, 1996. 
14. Such a view in hotly contested by agents of the state and considerable effort and expenditure 
are exerted in attempting to portray the state as neutral umpire, keeping the waning traditions 
apart. Within such a paradigm the state is beleaguered, at times bewildered, but ultimately benign 
(Curds 1983; Rolston and Miller 1996). 
15. Speech by the Chief Constable of the RUC at the Annual General Meeting of the British 
Society of Criminology, 4 December 1996. 
16. Figures provided by the RUC Equal Opportunities Unit. 
17. For example the PANI research found that 81% of Protestants believed that the RUC treated 
everyone equally compared to 67% of Catholics who thought that Protestants were treated better 
and 85% of Protestants compared to only 48% of Catholics who thought the RUC were doing a 
good job. The O’Mahony et al. study (1997), which broke down respondents into socioeconomic, 
religious and geographical groups found similar alienation from the police with 62% of Catholic 
working class respondents stating that they thought Protestants were treated better. 
18. The RUC Drugs Squad on I January 1970 consisted of one Sergeant, two Constables (one 
trained in dog handling for cannabis recovery), and one woman constable (RUC 1970:40). 
19. Interviewer: “Do the RUC use petty criminals as informers on the paramilitaries?” 
Respondent: 
“Informer is rather a loaded term since it smacks of betrayal or treachery. We prefer to think of it 
as helping the police. As you know it is the duty of every citizen to give relevant information to 
the police. All police work needs intelligence and that is especially true in facing the ongoing 
terrorist threat in Northern Ireland. It is in fact the duty of every policeman to collect 
information.” Interview with RUC officer August 1991 (McEvoy 1991). 
20. For example the main Catholic newspaper in Northern Ireland, often critical of the RUC on its 
human rights record, led with an editorial entitled, “Drug Squad must be given Priority” (Irish 
News 1995). 
21. The Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act applies to persons suspected or charged 
with terrorist offenses. Among other powers, the Act allows for warrantless arrests and searches 
and authorizes non-jury (one-judge) trials for persons accused of terrorist offenses. 
22. “Ordinary decent crime” or “ODC” is an official phrase that refers to non-terrorist offenses. 
23. Fewer respondents were selected to complete the questions about illicit drug use. The 
response rate for this sub-sample has not yet been published. 
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ILLICIT DRUG USE IN IRELAND: AN OVERVIEW 
OF THE PROBLEM AND POLICY RESPONSES 
Aileen O’Gorman 
Problematic drug use, mainly regarding the use of opiates, has been identified as 
a major social problem in Ireland. Such problematic drug use has been found to 
be concentrated in Dublin’s inner city areas and outer estates where poverty, 
multi-generational unemployment, high population density (particularly of young 
adults), and poor facilities are the norm. Policy responses, although 
acknowledging the environmental context of the drug problem, have tended to 
focus on the medical treatment of the individual, rather than tackling the wider 
social and economic issues. 
Introduction 
 To date, few research studies on the patterns and prevalence of illicit drug use have been 
conducted in Ireland. Evidence identifies three main illicit drug-using groups; those whose main 
drug of use are either opiates (often mixed with benzodiazepines). Ecstasy, or cannabis. It is with 
the former group that most concern arises, for as noted in the recent governmental report of the 
Ministerial Task Force on Measures to Reduce the Demand for Drugs: 
Ireland’s drug problem is primarily an opiates problem - mainly heroin... [and] is 
principally a Dublin phenomenon (Department of the Taoiseach 1996:5). 
 Given the social problem that such opiate use entails for the individual, their families, local 
neighborhoods, and the wider society, this paper focuses on the development of such problematic 
drug use and the responses by policy makers and local communities. The paper draws on existing 
research as well as initial trends from a study on the environmental context of problematic drug 
use.1 
The Development of an Opiate Drug Culture 
In the 1960s and 1970s, research on the use of illicit drugs in Ireland found evidence of 
amphetamine (Walsh 1966), cannabis, and LSD use (Masterson 1970; Nevin et al. 1971). 
However, neither these research studies nor indicators of drug use (i.e. seizures, prosecutions, and 
treatment) demonstrated a sufficiently widespread extent of use to warrant much concern. 
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